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THE DEATH OF DIVERSITY?  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
IN THE WORKPLACE AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED 
Katherine M. Planer∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Soon after the Supreme Court of the United States handed 
down its “bitterly divided”1 ruling in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,2 news outlets launched debates 
about what the decision meant for the future of integration in public 
schools and the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education.3  Less debated in 
the mainstream media is the effect that Parents Involved will have in 
the realm of employment law.  While it may seem to be a tremendous 
leap to equate a ruling about education to the entirely distinct field 
of employment, a closer look at both jurisprudence and scholarly li-
terature reveals that courts have often treated employers and educa-
tors with a similar level of deference.4  After the Court’s landmark de-
cision in Grutter v. Bollinger,5 scholars in the field of employment law 
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, The College of 
New Jersey.  The author would like to thank Professor Edward Hartnett for his inva-
luable input and guidance and Professor Charles Sullivan for inspiring this Com-
ment and for his assistance and constant encouragement.  The author also would 
like to thank her mother, Patricia Gallagan, and brother, Thomas Planer, who have 
always supported her unconditionally and without whom her accomplishments 
would be few.  If it is appropriate to dedicate this Comment to someone, the author 
would like to dedicate it to her grandfather, William Gallagan, who always cham-
pioned her abilities, listened with great interest to her ideas, and would have been 
extraordinarily proud to see her name in print. 
 1 Jess Bravin & Daniel Golden, Court Limits How Districts Integrate Schools—Race-
Based Policy Ban Augurs Broad Changes; Clash Over Brown Case, WALL ST. J., June 29, 
2007, at A1. 
 2 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 3 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Divided Court Limits Use of Race by School Districts, WASH. 
POST, June 29, 2007, at A01; Bravin & Golden, supra note 1; Linda Greenhouse, Jus-
tices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race In Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at 
A1. 
 4 Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of 
Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 270–71 (2003). 
 5 539 U.S. 306 (2004). 
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published a multitude of works6 analyzing the probable effect of Grut-
ter on affirmative-action programs in the workplace, both in the pub-
lic sector, which is governed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and in the private 
sector,7 which is governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8  
While Parents Involved did not change the meaning of Grutter per se, it 
did explicitly limit the reach of Grutter’s holding to higher education.9  
Thus, Parents Involved potentially put in jeopardy the scholarly argu-
ments and modes of legal interpretation that rested on Grutter’s 
foundation.  The question arises: how did Parents Involved change the 
way scholars and courts must view workplace affirmative-action pro-
grams? 
Both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit racial 
discrimination, but they are not interpreted to impose the same re-
strictions.  Title VII has long been interpreted to allow employers to 
engage in affirmative action not only to remedy their own past dis-
crimination but also to open opportunities and to remedy racial im-
balances in their workforce.10  Equal protection has not afforded em-
ployers the same opportunities or, at least, has not done so as clearly 
as Title VII.  Thus, Title VII is often described as being “more permis-
sive” than the Equal Protection Clause when it comes to allowing em-
ployers to consider race in their employment decisions.11 
Prior to Parents Involved, the distinctions between Title VII and 
the Equal Protection Clause played out in the form of two arguments 
 
 6 See, e.g., Lorin J. Lapidus, Diversity’s Divergence: A Post-Grutter Examination of Ra-
cial Preferences in Public Employment, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199 (2006); Ronald Turn-
er, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 
199 (2005); White, supra note 4. 
 7 Employees can sue both private and public employers for violations of Title 
VII.  See White, supra note 4, at 265.  Typically, however, employees bring suits against 
public employers under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Stephen J. Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress Discrimination in Public Employment: 
Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 93, 99–103 (1985) (describing the 
substantive differences between Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the vehicle for 
bringing suit against the government for violation of constitutional rights, such as the 
Fourteenth Amendment— and explaining why some claimants might prefer the con-
stitutional route).  Thus, this Comment will refer to Title VII actions as those against 
“private” employers because those are the type of employers frequently sued under 
the statute. 
 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 9 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753 
(2007) (“The specific interest found compelling in Grutter was student body diversity 
in the context of higher education.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203–07 (1979). 
 11 See, e.g., Eric A. Tilles, Casenote, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Af-
firmative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451, 462–63 (2004). 
PLANER (Final Edit) 1/13/2010  5:23 PM 
2009] COMMENT 1335 
in favor of diversity as a valid justification for affirmative action.  The 
“parity” argument, which is the primary focus of this Comment, es-
sentially claims that if diversity could be considered a compelling jus-
tification for workplace affirmative action in the public realm, espe-
cially after Grutter, then it should necessarily be considered a valid 
reason under Title VII.12  That argument was significantly under-
mined by the decision in Parents Involved, but it may still find some 
support in Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence.  On the other 
hand, the “statutory” argument contends that the justification for di-
versity and affirmative action lies within the text and legislative history 
of Title VII itself.13  While that argument receives significantly less at-
tention, it may nonetheless be vitally important to the survival of di-
versity as a basis for affirmative action in employment because of both 
the Parents Involved decision and the current makeup of the Court. 
The subject of this Comment is academically significant not only 
because of the freshness of Parents Involved, which has been a contro-
versial decision that will produce a multitude of scholarly works, but 
also because Parents Involved seemingly undermines the current state 
of legal analysis in the realm of diversity and affirmative action in the 
workplace.  The “parity” theory in favor of diversity in the workplace 
appears to hinge almost completely on Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence, and even there its survival is debatable.  As for the “statutory” 
theory, the Court’s recent history of narrow statutory interpretation 
makes the chances of success less likely, although the pro-business na-
ture of the Court leaves some room for debate if employers could de-
vise sufficient business justifications for diversity in the workplace. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of Title VII juri-
sprudence to emphasize the greater deference historically granted to 
employers under Title VII as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause.  
Part II also analyzes the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit decision in Taxman v. Board of Education,14 a pre-Grutter 
decision, which held that, despite the broader range of permissible 
behavior sanctioned under Title VII’s “remedial” concept, Title VII 
did not permit race-based employment decisions designed to pro-
mote diversity.15  Part III provides analysis of the Parents Involved deci-
sion and specifically focuses on the definition of “diversity” as a com-
pelling interest and its future application to employment cases.  Part 
 
 12 See id. 
 13 See White, supra note 4, at 275. 
 14 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 15 Id. at 1558 (“Here, there is no congressional recognition of diversity as a Title 
VII objective requiring accommodation.”). 
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III also discusses the ways in which scholarly arguments about Grutter 
and Title VII are no longer as persuasive after Parents Involved.  Final-
ly, Part III inquires whether diversity can ever be used to justify affir-
mative action in employment in a way that would not violate Title VII. 
II. CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE 
While both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit 
employment discrimination, they are not interpreted to impose the 
same restrictions.  Courts are generally less stringent when interpret-
ing Title VII, particularly with regard to the only court-approved justi-
fication for affirmative action in the work place—remedying prior 
discrimination.16  Unlike its meaning under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the “remedial justification” for affirmative action under Title 
VII can extend beyond remedying prior discrimination at the specific 
workplace in question to remedying a more general “discrepancy” of 
the minority group in the workforce.  Equal protection has not ex-
tended the meaning of “remedial” to such lengths or, at least, has not 
done so as clearly.   
A. An Overview of Title VII Jurisprudence 
The history of the Supreme Court’s evaluation of affirmative-
action programs under Title VII is relatively brief.  The Court de-
cided two cases, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber17 and Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency,18 which form the substance of American affir-
mative-action jurisprudence within the private sector as governed by 
Title VII.  Johnson, the more recent of the two, was decided twenty 
years ago, and though there have been significant developments in 
other areas of race-conscious jurisprudence,19 the Court has yet to of-
fer any additional specific guidance to lower courts evaluating the va-
lidity of workplace affirmative-action programs under Title VII.  Fur-
thermore, while Weber and Johnson offer some bright-line rules for 
evaluating the statutory validity of workplace affirmative-action pro-
grams, the cases do not establish exclusive guidelines for what type of 
 
 16 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987) (holding an affirma-
tive-action program statutorily valid even though it was intended not to remedy spe-
cific instances of past discrimination but instead to address a more general “conspi-
cuous imbalance” of female and minority employees to white male employees in the 
field). 
 17 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 18 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 19 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003). 
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rationale can be considered a “valid” reason for using a race-
conscious program in employment.20  This lack of exclusivity and 
guidance left room for scholars to argue over the future of this realm 
of judicial interpretation, and scholars have done so by often using 
Grutter as a signal of a more expansive approach on the part of the 
courts.21 
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 
Weber was significant because it was the first Supreme Court case 
to address whether a workplace affirmative-action program was per-
missible under Title VII.22  The case involved a group of white males 
who sued their union and employer for a violation of Title VII after 
they were not granted admission into a workplace training program 
for skilled craft workers even though they were technically more qual-
ified than the black workers selected.23  The union and employer 
adopted a plan that required fifty percent of the seats in the training 
program to go to black workers until such time as the number of 
black workers at the plant was proportional to the number of black 
workers in the workforce.24  At issue was whether Title VII forbade 
private employers and unions from enacting voluntary race-based 
“bona fide” affirmative-action programs.25  The Court held that Title 
VII did not forbid private employers and unions from adopting such 
plans.26 
The plaintiffs challenged the program under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a),27 which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
 
 20 See White, supra note 4, at 274 (“Neither Weber nor Johnson categorically holds 
that affirmative action must be remedially-based to be statutorily permissible.”). 
 21 See infra Part III.A (describing post-Grutter scholarship in this area). 
 22 Richard N. Appel, Alison L. Gray & Nilufer Loy, Affirmative Action in the 
Workplace: Forty Years Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 549, 561 (2005). 
 23 Weber, 443 U.S. at 198–200. 
 24 Id. at 199. 
 25 Id. at 200. 
 26 Id. at 208. 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The statute states the following: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
     (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
     (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
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against employees based on certain characteristics, such as race, sex, 
and ethnicity.28  The Court refused to construe Title VII literally, 
which would have strictly prohibited even “beneficial” discrimination 
(such as affirmative action), and instead interpreted Title VII in ac-
cordance with the Court’s understanding of legislative intent as ex-
pressed through the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, with 
specific focus on Title VII.29  The Court found that Congress intended 
Title VII to remedy racial discrimination in the workplace and that 
Congress intended to do so by encouraging private industry to take 
its own action (or, at least, not discouraging the industry from taking 
action).30 
To ensure that employers did not abuse the seemingly broad 
discretion that the Court had given them to formulate affirmative-
action programs, the Court developed a two-pronged analysis that fo-
cuses on congressional intent and the interests of white employees, 
which has subsequently been utilized by employers and courts in de-
termining the legality of affirmative-action plans under Title VII.31  
First, the Court noted that the plan at issue mirrored the intent of 
Congress because its express purpose was to “break down old patterns 
of racial segregation and hierarchy.”32  In this case, though the specif-
ic labor union had not admitted to racially discriminatory practices, 
the Court recognized that black skilled craftworkers had “long been 
excluded from craft unions” in the labor force.33  Thus, the Court 
held the voluntary program was justified because it was designed “to 
open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which 
have been traditionally closed to them.”34 
Second, the Court held that the plan did not “unnecessarily 
trammel” the interests of white employees.35  It neither required the 
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black 
hires nor created an absolute bar to the advancement of white em-
ployees.36  Additionally, the Court opined that the plan was a “tempo-
rary measure”37 designed to end as soon as the percentage of black 
 
Id. 
 28 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199–200. 
 29 Id. at 201–08. 
 30 Id. at 204–08. 
 31 Id. at 208. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 198. 
 34 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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skilled craftworkers was roughly equal to the percentage of blacks in 
the local labor force.38  Therefore, the Court concluded, private em-
ployers could enact voluntary affirmative-action plans if those plans 
met the requirements that Weber set forth. 
2. Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
In Johnson, the Court set forth additional guidelines enhancing 
the Weber Court’s interpretation of permissible affirmative-action 
measures. 39   The issue in Johnson was whether an affirmative-action 
program that resulted in the hiring of a woman over an equally or 
better-qualified man violated Title VII.40  The Court found that pro-
gram to be legally valid.  The Johnson Court established factors for de-
termining both when it was appropriate for an employer to enact an 
affirmative-action program and what type of program was acceptable.41  
In addition to the more “traditional” remedial justification expressed 
by the employer in Weber, in which the employer used racial consid-
erations to remedy its own specific instances of discrimination, the 
Johnson Court held that it was appropriate for an employer to adopt 
an affirmative-action program if the employer could identify a “con-
spicuous imbalance” in job categories traditionally segregated by race 
and sex.42  Thus, the employer need not prove that there was any ac-
tual discrimination exhibited by the employer against blacks or wom-
en; the employer need merely prove that an imbalance existed.43 
Additionally, the Court concluded that once an employer can 
justify the need for an affirmative-action plan, the plan needs to meet 
certain requirements.  Primarily, the employer must demonstrate that 
the plan “represents a . . . flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting 
a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and wom-
en” in the workplace.44  Therefore, employment decisions cannot be 
justified solely by reference to the imbalance but must rest on “a mul-
titude of practical, realistic factors.”45  This focus on an individualized 
 
 38 Id. at 208–09. 
 39 See Appel, Gray & Loy, supra note 22, at 562–63. 
 40 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 619 (1987). 
 41 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640–41. 
 42 Id. at 640. 
 43 Id. at 630. 
 44 Id. at 642. 
 45 Id. at 640–41.  Those factors include 
commit[ment] . . . to annual adjustment of goals so as to provide a rea-
sonable guide for actual hiring and promotion decisions.  [It] ear-
marks no positions for anyone; sex is but one of several factors that may 
be taken into account in evaluating qualified applicants for a position . 
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plan that considers race or gender as just one of many factors may 
seem familiar because it is similar to the type of race-conscious col-
lege admissions plan advocated by Justice Powell in his Regents of Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke opinion.46  In fact, the Johnson Court cited 
Bakke with approval in that regard, stating that “[t]he Plan [at issue] 
thus resembles the ‘Harvard Plan’ approvingly noted by Justice Pow-
ell in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, which considers race 
along with other criteria in determining admission to the college.”47 
Thus, although the courts apply different standards for affirma-
tive-action challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and those brought under Title VII, some overlap 
exists between the rationale used by courts to satisfy strict scrutiny in 
educational affirmative-action cases and the grounds advocated by 
the Johnson Court as satisfying Title VII affirmative-action considera-
tions.48  But the corresponding ideas between constitutional strict 
scrutiny and statutory analysis under Title VII relate only to the 
means.  Neither the Weber Court nor the Johnson Court purported to 
adopt Justice Powell’s suggested compelling end of diversity and in-
stead restricted the permissible justification for Title VII affirmative 
action to remedial purposes, albeit the more “expansive” interpreta-
tion of “remedial” set forth in Johnson, in which an employer could 
remedy a “conspicuous imbalance.”49  Significantly, however, neither 
decision established the remedial justification as the exclusive ratio-
nale for employers seeking to use affirmative-action programs in the 
workplace.50  Additionally, the Johnson majority suggests that any kind 
of affirmative action that would be permissible for the government 
 
. . .  [Further], the Agency has no intention of establishing a work force 
whose permanent composition is dictated by rigid numerical standards. 
Id. at 641. 
 46 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316–19 (1978). 
 47 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. 
 48 In Bakke, Justice Powell applied the following standard of strict scrutiny: “[I]n 
order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose 
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the 
classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguard-
ing of its interest.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).  While 
Justice Powell found that the state’s interest in promoting diversity in higher educa-
tion was “constitutionally permissible,” he found that the quota system was not neces-
sary to accomplish that goal.  Id. at 311–15.  Instead, Justice Powell suggested indivi-
dualized considerations of student backgrounds, such as those promulgated in the 
Harvard Plan, as a constitutionally permissible means of satisfying the compelling 
end of diversity.  Id. at 315–17. 
 49 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640. 
 50 White, supra note 4, at 274 (“Neither Weber nor Johnson categorically holds that 
affirmative action must be remedially-based to be statutorily permissible.”). 
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under Equal Protection would also be permissible for an employer 
under Title VII and, thus, indicated that a compelling interest for the 
sake of strict scrutiny should also satisfy a Title VII inquiry. 51  The 
Court’s statement plays a vital role in the future analysis of the topic. 
B. Taxman: Tightening the Reins 
Using Johnson’s broader meaning of “remedial” as a starting 
point, some employers established affirmative-action programs de-
signed to further initiatives well beyond the traditional remedial con-
text.  Specifically, some employers engaged in race-based employ-
ment decisions designed to promote diversity,52 which, prior to 
Grutter, some lower courts concluded that Title VII did not permit.  
The most significant example of this was a decision by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Taxman v. Board of Education.53  
While no lower court decided a Title VII case in a manner contrary to 
Taxman after the Grutter decision, legal theorists argued that Grutter 
strengthened at least one of the primary arguments for permitting di-
versity as a justification for racial considerations in the workplace.54  
After Parents Involved, those theories may have lost their foundation.  
Nevertheless, the second theory—that diversity as a permissible justi-
fication for affirmative action may be justified by Title VII itself—still 
remains.  Thus, Taxman is significant because it clearly lays out the 
two arguments for allowing diversity to justify workplace affirmative 
action under Title VII.  Additionally, Taxman’s importance is bols-
tered by the fact that current Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito was 
one of the Third Circuit judges in the majority. 
Sharon Taxman was a white schoolteacher working for the Pisca-
taway Board of Education.55  Deborah Williams was a black school-
teacher with the same level of seniority, ability, and qualifications as 
Taxman.56  When the Board needed to lay off one teacher, it decided 
to use its affirmative-action policy as a “tiebreaker” between the two 
equally qualified candidates,57 and the Board retained Williams be-
 
 51 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (“[T]he statutory prohibition [in Title VII] with 
which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the 
Constitution.”). 
 52 See infra text accompanying notes 62–66. 
 53 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 54 See infra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
 55 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551. 
 56 Id. 
 57 The policy was used “to provide equal educational opportunity for students 
and equal employment opportunity for employees and prospective employees, and 
to make a concentrated effort to attract . . . minority personnel for all positions so 
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cause she was the only black teacher in the school’s Business Depart-
ment.58  Taxman filed suit against the Board under Title VII, alleging 
unlawful discrimination.59  Because the Board admitted that it used 
the affirmative-action program in rendering the employment deci-
sion, the only issue in the case was whether the program was valid 
under Title VII.60 
The court began its analysis by noting the “two primary goals” 
that Title VII was designed to further: ending discrimination so as to 
guarantee equal opportunities for employment and remedying the 
effects of past segregation and underrepresentation of certain minor-
ity groups in the workplace.61  The court derived the statute’s purpose 
from its legislative history and the congressional debates surrounding 
its enactment.62  Thus, the court concluded, “unless an affirmative ac-
tion plan has a remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror the 
purposes of the statute, and, therefore, cannot satisfy the first prong 
of the Weber test.”63  The Board’s affirmative-action plan explicitly con-
tained no remedial purpose and instead was designed to ensure that 
the staff was “culturally diverse.”64  The court found that the Board’s 
policy therefore failed to meet the Weber standard, and as a result, the 
Board violated the terms of Title VII when it invoked the program to 
fire Taxman.65  The court performed a strict statutory interpretation 
of Title VII, and that assessment reflected a narrow reading of the sta-
tute and its legislative history.  This focus on the language of Title VII 
was significant because while the issue of whether the statute itself 
permits diversity as a rationale for affirmative action in the workplace 
has been the subject of little focus and debate both in the courts and 
 
that their qualifications c[ould] be evaluated along with other candidates.”  Id. at 
1550 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The policy applied to “every aspect of em-
ployment including . . . layoffs.”  Id.  Further, the  
policy did not have any remedial purpose; it was not adopted with the 
intention of remedying the results of any prior discrimination or iden-
tified underrepresentation of minorities within the Piscataway Public 
School System.  At all relevant times, Black teachers were neither un-
derrepresented nor underutilized in the Piscataway School District 
work force.   
Id. at 1550–51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58 Id. at 1551–52. 
 59 Id. at 1552. 
 60 Id. at 1556.  For an unknown reason, Taxman did not assert an Equal Protec-
tion claim.  Id. at 1552 n.5. 
 61 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1550–52. 
 65 Id. at 1558. 
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in academia, it may play a huge role in the future of diversity in 
workplace affirmative-action programs after Parents Involved. 
Also significant was the court’s rejection of the Board’s attempt 
to use Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection case law to justify di-
versity as a purpose that mirrors the intent of Title VII such that it 
would comprise a valid basis for an affirmative-action program.66  The 
court’s analysis is important because it addressed a “faulty premise” 
upon which the Board’s argument was based and that many employ-
ment scholars invoked after Grutter to draw a connection between 
Equal Protection and Title VII.67  This “faulty premise” is as follows: 
since the Supreme Court noted in Johnson that “‘the statutory prohi-
bition [in Title VII] with which an employer must contend was not 
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution[,]’[] . . . a pur-
pose which survives constitutional strict scrutiny necessarily passes 
muster under Title VII’s permissible purpose test.”68 
The Third Circuit had two problems with that argument.  First, 
the Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had not held that a 
purpose that satisfies strict scrutiny must necessarily satisfy Title VII.69  
The court viewed the language from Johnson quoted by the Board not 
as a holding but simply as the majority’s response to Justice Scalia’s 
dissent arguing that Title VII is in fact more restrictive than the Con-
stitution.70  Second, the court rejected the Board’s argument that di-
versity was a compelling interest that satisfied strict scrutiny.71  It dis-
missed the Board’s reliance on Bakke, finding that “Bakke’s factual 
and legal setting, as well as the diversity that universities aspire to in 
their student bodies, are . . . different from the facts, relevant law and 
the racial diversity purpose involved in this case . . . .”72 
Upon examining the court’s second ground for rejecting the 
Board’s argument, the rationale behind much of the post-Grutter 
scholarship arguing for equating diversity to a valid purpose for Title 
VII affirmative-action programs becomes evident.  Grutter meant that, 
at last, a clear majority of the Court was validating diversity as a com-
pelling interest that survived strict scrutiny.73  Scholars argued that 
 
 66 Id. at 1559. 
 67 See, e.g., White, supra note 4. 
 68 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1559. 
 69 Id. at 1560. 
 70 Id. at 1560–61. 
 71 Id. at 1560. 
 72 Id. at 1562. 
 73 The Court’s decision validated an even broader concept of diversity than the 
First Amendment academic-freedom diversity suggested by Justice Powell in Bakke.  
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (describing academic-
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Grutter expanded upon what the majority in Johnson suggested—that 
Title VII necessarily reaches at least as far as the Constitution, if not 
further—and, with Grutter as good law, scholars contended that diver-
sity as the primary purpose behind a private affirmative-action pro-
gram might be legal under Title VII.74  The Court, however, has not 
reconciled Title VII and the Constitution, and Parents Involved likely 
stripped away the arguments for diversity in the workplace almost as 
quickly as they had arisen from Grutter. 
III. DIVERSITY’S EVOLUTION 
A. Grutter and Title VII: Shaping Legal Analysis 
After the Court’s decision in Grutter, scholars in the field of em-
ployment law jumped at the chance to analyze the Court’s first opi-
nion in more than twenty years about racial-preference programs in 
education.75  What made Grutter more significant than other recent 
racial-preference cases related to employment was its compelling-
interest rationale.76  For the first time, a majority of the Court held 
that higher-education institutions had a compelling interest in 
achieving diversity on campus.77  That was significant because the de-
cision signaled a break from the “remedial paradigm” of race-
conscious selection programs and permitted institutions to consider 
 
freedom diversity).  That is why Grutter was extraordinarily significant for the purpos-
es of analyzing diversity in the workplace. 
 74 See, e.g., Tilles, supra note 11, at 463–64. 
 75 The last case to discuss racial-preference programs in higher education was Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 76 Past employment discrimination decisions did not seem to support the idea 
that diversity could ever constitute a compelling governmental interest such that it 
could survive strict scrutiny; in fact, the decisions barely embraced the constitutional-
ity of affirmative action for remedial purposes.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “government can 
never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 
‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction”); Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (holding that the city “failed to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of 
race”).  In Adarand, however, Justice O’Connor did not completely rule out the gov-
ernment’s ability to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest for instituting di-
versity-based affirmative-action programs.  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (opining that 
strict scrutiny analysis is not “‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’ . . . [and] [w]hen race-
based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within con-
stitutional constraints if it satisfies the ‘narrow tailoring’ test”).  Whether that sugges-
tion expressed the opinion of the Court is unclear because that idea might be 
deemed inconsistent with Justice Scalia’s concurrence and, thus, only the view of the 
plurality. 
 77 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
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race even if there was no evidence of past discrimination at the par-
ticular institution.78  To that end, the Court noted that colleges could 
use individualized considerations of race and gender, among other 
characteristics, as a narrowly tailored method of achieving that diver-
sity.79  The Grutter decision was especially important in the realm of 
employment law because the Court’s rationale for finding diversity as 
a compelling interest was based not only upon Justice Powell’s origi-
nal First Amendment justification in Bakke80 but also on sociological 
factors that included the American workforce.81 
A logical connection exists between affirmative action in higher 
education and affirmative action in the public workplace because 
both types of programs are subject to judicial strict scrutiny under 
Equal Protection analysis;82 thus, scholars discussed at length the po-
tential impact of Grutter on public-employment affirmative action.83  
Additionally, the parties arguing in favor of diversity in Grutter, as well 
as Justice O’Connor’s opinion, mentioned the need for diversity in 
the workplace, which made the topic ripe for academic discussion af-
ter the Grutter decision.84  An examination of scholarly literature after 
Grutter demonstrates that this argument was the principal one ad-
vanced by legal theorists.85  While many sophisticated and well-
 
 78 Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 215, 216–17 (2004). 
 79 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
 80 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (A diverse student body is clearly “a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.  Academic freedom . . . long 
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.  The freedom of a 
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its stu-
dent body.”). 
 81 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“These benefits [of diversity] are not theoretical but 
real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s 
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”); see also Tilles, supra note 11, at 458 
(classifying the “second” group of interests the Court identified in Grutter as “those 
interests that contribute to society by educating a diverse population”).  Tilles further 
explains that 
[t]he interests identified in the second group, however, go well beyond 
Bakke’s rationale[, as they] . . . are concerned with meeting societal 
goals, not accommodating academic freedom . . . . The preeminent 
concern in this second group is the benefit received by society by provid-
ing an education to a diverse population. 
Tilles, supra note 11, at 459 (emphasis added). 
 82 See generally Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying 
strict scrutiny to Equal Protection inquiries in public employment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
361–62 (applying strict scrutiny to Equal Protection inquiries in higher education). 
 83 See, e.g., Lapidus, supra note 6; Turner, supra note 6; White, supra note 4. 
 84 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003). 
 85 See, e.g., Lapidus, supra note 6; Turner, supra note 6; White, supra note 4. 
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respected employment-law academics hypothesized about the impact 
that Grutter would have on both public- and private-employment af-
firmative-action programs,86 the few decisions relating to the topic did 
not quite match most scholars’ expectations.87  Additionally, even if 
those scholars correctly interpreted the state of legal affairs, Parents 
Involved seems to undermine those legal arguments by distinguishing 
Grutter and narrowing the scope of diversity as a justification for af-
firmative action in the public-education setting.88 
Perhaps the most important distinction to keep in mind when 
analyzing the education decisions through the lens of employment 
law is the difference in judicial interpretation between public em-
ployment challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and private employment challenged under Title 
VII.  The former cases are analyzed using strict scrutiny whereas the 
latter use the Weber test.89  While all scholars addressed this distinction 
in their post-Grutter affirmative-action analyses, some chose to equate 
the two to make the analysis more succinct or to suggest a solution to 
the inherent inconsistencies between the two doctrines.90  Other 
scholars argued that it was precisely the difference between the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII that meant Grutter would necessarily 
impact Title VII if it impacted public employment.91  The latter line of 
arguments comprises this Part’s focus.  Essentially, scholars main-
tained that if diversity was considered a compelling interest for enact-
ing race-conscious programs in public employment, diversity should 
 
 86 See generally Lapidus, supra note 6, at 200 (analyzing the Grutter decision’s po-
tential impact on the diversity rationale for affirmative action in public employment); 
Turner, supra note 6, at 200 (discussing the prospect of employers “develop[ing] di-
versity-based justifications for voluntary affirmative action in their workplaces” after 
the Court’s decision in Grutter); White, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing the extent to 
which Grutter might “affect a public or private employer’s ability to voluntarily adopt 
an affirmative action plan in order to diversify its workforce”). 
 87 See Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no 
compelling interest in promoting the “educational benefits” of diversity in a fire-
house through a purely race-based reassignment program).  But see Petit v. City of 
Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (relying very heavily on Grutter to find a com-
pelling interest in diversity that justified the police department’s use of racial classifi-
cations through an affirmative-action program). 
 88 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754 
(2007). 
 89 See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text. 
 90 See, e.g., Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in 
Employment After Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091 
(2006). 
 91 Tilles, supra note 11, at 463. 
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be a permissible rationale for private employers.92  Thus, similar to 
Taxman, the analysis was twofold: first, whether, after Grutter, courts 
would find that diversity was a compelling interest in employment; 
second, if diversity satisfied the Constitution, it necessarily meant that 
diversity could justify affirmative action under Title VII. 
The issue of whether Title VII permitted, in private employment, 
workplace affirmative-action programs that would be permitted in the 
public sector under constitutional analysis was still debatable,93 but 
many scholars argued that Grutter lent substance to the argument that 
diversity would be viewed as a compelling interest in the public sec-
tor.94  That, in turn, made the argument that Title VII should include 
a diversity rationale more compelling.  Some scholars argued that the 
underpinnings of the Constitution and Title VII were inherently the 
same and thus should be interpreted accordingly.95  Specifically, one 
scholar noted that because Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment 
“share a fundamental antidiscrimination and integrationist policy,” 
the interests in diversity by corporate employers mentioned in the 
Grutter decision “remain the same when the legal analysis shifts from 
constitutional to statutory law.”96  Additionally, because “judicial defe-
rence to their decision-making is something educators and employers 
have in common,”97 the Court’s deference to institutions of higher 
education with regard to assessments of the need for and benefits of 
diversity may apply in the workplace.98 
Still other legal theorists suggested that, although the constitu-
tional and statutory interpretations were not identical, they should be 
interpreted the same way to resolve the “conflict” between Title VII 
and Equal Protection jurisprudence that would arise if diversity were 
held to be compelling in public employment but not the private sec-
tor.99  Building on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Johnson, in 
which she noted that the analysis under the two claims was essentially 
 
 92 See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 274. 
 93 Compare White, supra note 4, at 274 (“Johnson could be read to suggest [Title 
VII] will be at least as accommodating as the Constitution.”) with Taxman v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1560 (3d Cir. 1996) (“While the Supreme Court 
may indeed at some future date hold that an affirmative action purpose that satisfies 
the Constitution must necessarily satisfy Title VII, it has yet to do so.”). 
 94 See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 270; Lapidus, supra note 6, at 250. 
 95 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 6, at 233. 
 96 Id. 
 97 White, supra note 4, at 271. 
 98 Turner, supra note 6, at 233. 
 99 Tilles, supra note 11, at 464. 
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the same and should be treated as such by the judiciary,100 one scholar 
noted that “[i]ncorporating the Grutter approach into the Title VII 
analysis would permit a private employer to adopt an affirmative-
action plan if it was able to establish that the affirmative-action plan 
yielded . . . similar societal good as the affirmative-action plan utilized 
by the University of Michigan Law School.”101 
Other scholars asserted that, even if diversity was not considered 
to be a compelling interest for affirmative action in public employ-
ment, it could still be considered a legal justification for affirmative 
action in the private sector.102  Because Johnson permitted employers 
to institute affirmative-action programs for non-remedial purposes, 
even if they had not actually discriminated but if instead there was a 
“conspicuous imbalance” of certain minorities in the workforce, scho-
lars noted that “employers ha[d] more freedom under Title VII to 
engage in remedially-based affirmative action than the [C]onstitution 
permits . . . .  [A] private employer can engage in affirmative action 
in situations where a public employer, constrained by the Constitu-
tion, cannot.”103  That flexibility in the remedial realm, combined 
with the language in Johnson indicating that Title VII was not in-
tended to be as limiting as the Constitution for employers,104 provided 
support sufficient to make a reasonable argument that “the statute 
will be at least as accommodating as the Constitution.”105  Further, 
some scholars argued that the Court’s refusal to limit affirmative ac-
tion in the public realm under Equal Protection only to remedial 
purposes “suggests it will follow a similar approach in interpreting 
[Title VII].”106 
That was the state of legal analysis until the decision in Parents 
Involved.  While no court ruled on a Title VII diversity claim between 
the time the Court decided Grutter and Parents Involved, a number of 
courts decided cases challenging diversity as a compelling interest for 
workplace affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
 
 100 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 649 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (“[T]he proper initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action 
plan by a public employer under Title VII is no different from that required by the 
Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 101 Tilles, supra note 11, at 464. 
 102 White, supra note 4, at 275. 
 103 Id. at 273. 
 104 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (“[T]he statutory prohibition [in Title VII] with 
which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the 
Constitution.”). 
 105 White, supra note 4, at 274. 
 106 Id. at 275. 
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those courts reached mixed results.107 An analysis of Parents Involved 
will demonstrate that those scholars’ arguments were largely under-
mined but that the statutory argument for using affirmative-action 
programs to further diversity in the workplace still remains. 
B. Parents Involved: A Case About Employment? 
Much like Grutter, Parents Involved is clearly not a case about em-
ployment law; its explicit application is in the realm of education.  
Just as Grutter did after it was decided in 2003, however, Parents In-
volved adds to the conversation on affirmative action, even in the pri-
vate sector covered only by Title VII.  The case restricts the reasoning 
of Grutter, which had allowed scholars to hypothesize about the ex-
pansion of permissible affirmative-action justifications beyond the 
remedial reasons to the concept of diversity. 
In Parents Involved, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of 
two voluntary race-based school-assignment plans under which stu-
dents were classified by race and the school districts used race as a 
deciding factor in some instances when determining what school a 
student would attend.108  A majority of the Court held that the plans 
were unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.109  But a majority of Jus-
tices could not reach agreement as to the rationale behind this deci-
sion.  The Court held that the compelling interest purported to be 
achieved through the programs was neither remedial in nature110 nor 
the diversity-in-higher-education rationale recognized in Grutter111 and 
that the use of race was not necessary to accomplish the goals that the 
school districts sought to achieve.112  The disagreement among the 
Justices was with regard to the most important issues when consider-
ing strict scrutiny: compelling interest and narrowly tailored means.  
For the purposes of this analysis, this Comment focuses only on the 
former consideration.  Specifically, this Comment concentrates on 
whether Parents Involved leaves room for diversity to qualify as a com-
 
 107 See, e.g., Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding 
that diversity is not compelling in the public employment context by using Grutter ra-
tionale and applying strict-scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause); Petit 
v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that diversity is 
compelling under Grutter rationale but applying more of an operational-needs test 
than a strict Grutter analysis). 
 108 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 
(2007). 
 109 Id. at 2768. 
 110 Id. at 2752. 
 111 Id. at 2754. 
 112 Id. at 2753–54, 2760. 
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pelling interest outside of the specific Grutter context of higher edu-
cation. 
The analysis of this consideration is further restricted by the lack 
of discussion of the matter in the plurality opinion, which thus gives 
no indication of how a majority opinion on this specific issue might 
rule.  The plurality, composed of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia, did not consider whether racial diversity in 
schools was compelling because the Justices found that the actual end 
that each school districts attempted to achieve was racial balancing.113  
The Justices in the plurality found that the school districts’ plans were 
“tied to each district’s specific racial demographics, rather than to 
any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the 
asserted educational benefits.”114  The school districts used percen-
tage ranges to determine whether the racial and ethnic goals in their 
districts were satisfied by making sure that the percentage of white or 
black enrollment in schools was within ten percentage points of the 
average number of whites or blacks living in the community.115  Thus, 
the plurality stated that “[i]n design and operation, the plans are di-
rected only to racial balance, pure and simple.”116 
The plurality firmly reiterated that racial balancing was an illegi-
timate objective that was not compelling for the purposes of strict-
scrutiny analysis.117  The Justices reached that conclusion by examin-
ing the means by which the school districts sought to achieve their 
purported ends of “diversity.”118  The plurality found that “the racial 
demographics in each district . . . drive the required ‘diversity’ num-
bers” and, thus, that the plans “are not tailored to achieving a degree 
of diversity necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits.”119  
The plurality suggested that the plans are actually “tailored . . . to the 
goal . . . of attaining a level of diversity within the schools that approx-
imates the district’s overall demographics.”120  Thus, the plurality did 
not address whether diversity could be a compelling interest if a 
school district actually strove to accomplish diversity rather than mere 
racial balancing. 
 
 113 Id. at 2755. 
 114 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 2755–56. 
 120 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755–56. 
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On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which is 
most likely controlling,121 acknowledged that diversity is a compelling 
interest for a school district to pursue.122  Justice Kennedy found the 
plans at issue to be unconstitutional because of their means, not their 
purported ends.123  Justice Kennedy shared the plurality’s skepticism 
that the districts’ supposed ends of diversity were the actual ends and 
that the districts were not just racially balancing under the guise of 
“diversity.”124  Justice Kennedy, however, acknowledged that, in gen-
eral, diversity is a compelling interest for a school district to attain.125  
Justice Kennedy asserted that the plurality was “too dismissive” of the 
government’s legitimate interest in “ensuring all people have equal 
opportunity regardless of their race.”126  He then suggested ways in 
which school districts can “seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal 
educational opportunity” using “race-conscious measures . . . in a 
general way and without treating each student in different fashion 
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”127  But 
while Justice Kennedy was willing to acknowledge that diversity can be 
a compelling interest in certain situations, he was careful to note that 
racial classification should only be used to achieve this, or any other 
compelling interest, as a last resort.128  Justice Kennedy did not elabo-
rate on why diversity might be considered compelling in the school 
context, but he granted the school districts a certain level of defe-
rence in accepting the fact that diversity has “educational benefits”.129  
He focused more on the means by which a school may achieve this 
goal.130  Significantly, he did not address the “social benefits” aspect of 
diversity to which Justice O’Connor devoted so much of her opinion 
in Grutter.131 
 
 121 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). 
 122 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 123 Id. at 2790–91. 
 124 Id. at 2789–91. 
 125 Id. at 2789. 
 126 Id. at 2791. 
 127 Id. at 2791–92. 
 128 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 129 Id. at 2797. 
 130 Id. (“What the government is not permitted to do . . . is to classify every student 
on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classifica-
tion.”). 
 131 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003). 
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Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence preserves the ability of 
public entities, at least in the field of education, to rely on diversity as 
a compelling interest in certain situations, that notion is far more li-
mited than it was in Grutter.  That restraint is most clearly demon-
strated by Justice Kennedy’s suggestions for narrowly tailored me-
thods that might survive strict scrutiny.132  Interestingly, he suggested 
methods that he alleged would not trigger strict scrutiny—that is, race-
conscious but still race-neutral initiatives.133  For example, he sug-
gested “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance 
zones with general recognition of the demographics of the neigh-
borhoods; allocating resources for special programs; [and] recruiting 
students and faculty in a targeted fashion.”134  Thus, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that the executive and legislative branches take a more 
administrative approach towards achieving the goal of diversity in 
schools.135 
The decision in Parents Involved indicates that the Court limited 
the interpretation of diversity expressed in Grutter—diversity on cam-
pus to promote a diverse society, both at school and beyond—to 
higher education.  The majority specifically notes this point when it 
states that “[t]he specific interest found compelling in Grutter was 
student body diversity ‘in the context of higher education.’”136  
Whether a broader concept of diversity might still apply was not even 
addressed by the plurality, and although Justice Kennedy confirmed 
that diversity can be compelling in education outside of colleges and 
universities, the methods that he suggested towards accomplishing 
that end are even more restrictive than Grutter with regard to the level 
of racial classification that can be considered.  Although the decision 
 
 132 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 133 Id. (“These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treat-
ment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by 
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissi-
ble.”).  Why those means would not trigger strict scrutiny under Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), however, is far from clear.  Davis stands for the proposition that 
a selection system with an underlying purpose that is discriminatory cannot avoid 
strict-scrutiny analysis merely because it uses race-neutral means.  Id. at 241; Michelle 
Adams, Isn’t It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1729, 1760 (2001).  Professor Adams also notes that “the Equal Protection Clause 
is violated whenever state action is animated by a discriminatory purpose . . . .  From 
this perspective, the fact that the state has chosen to use ‘raceless’ means—[such as] 
a percentage plan—to effectuate discriminatory ends will not insulate it from consti-
tutional challenge.”  Adams, supra, at 1732.  Justice Kennedy did not discuss this pos-
sibility in his concurrence. 
 134 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 2753 (plurality opinion). 
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in Parents Involved is far from straightforward in terms of making a 
clear assertion about the future of diversity, both the plurality’s and 
Justice Kennedy’s close, careful analysis of the school district’s actual 
ends, as opposed to accepting the purported ends of diversity at face 
value, limits diversity as a goal of affirmative-action programs.  While 
diversity is not forever restricted only to the realm of higher educa-
tion, the message of the plurality, and of Justice Kennedy in particu-
lar, is that diversity cannot be a broad term applied to programs in 
which racial considerations are factors. 
The majority in Parents Involved was unabashed in its limitation 
to higher education of Grutter’s concept of diversity.  The Court sug-
gested that certain “key limitations” in Grutter’s “holding—defining a 
specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context 
of higher education”—should not be overlooked by lower courts 
when they attempt to extend “Grutter to uphold race-based assign-
ments in elementary and secondary schools.”137  Thus, the majority 
held that Grutter did not govern the school-assignment plans at issue 
and suggested that courts that applied the specific type of diversity re-
ferenced in Grutter to areas outside of the realm of higher education 
were simply incorrect.138 
That narrowing of diversity as a compelling interest compromis-
es the very foundation of many post-Grutter arguments for diversity in 
employment.139  While Justice Powell’s reasoning in Bakke stressed di-
versity for the sake of academic freedom and educational benefit to 
students,140 Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Grutter emphasized diver-
sity for the sake of society as a whole, including the workplace.141  Par-
ents Involved brought the focus of diversity back to an academic free-
dom rationale by emphasizing that even if diversity in higher 
education is compelling for more reasons than just academic free-
dom, that type of diversity does not extend beyond higher educa-
tion.142  Now, it seems that any public employer arguing that diversity 
was a compelling reason behind an affirmative-action program would 
 
 137 Id. at 2754. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See, e.g., Tilles, supra note 11, at 464. 
 140 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978). 
 141 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003). 
 142 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754 (2007) (“In upholding the admissions 
plan in Grutter, though, this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions 
of higher education, noting that in light of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and 
thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special 
niche in our constitutional tradition.’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329)). 
PLANER (Final Edit) 1/13/2010  5:23 PM 
1354 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1333 
be much less likely to succeed, particularly if the employer uses Grut-
ter’s sociological reasoning. 
This in turn undermines the strongest argument that previously 
existed for diversity under Title VII—the parity argument.  If Title VII 
and the Constitution are eventually interpreted to impose equivalent 
requirements, then it is likely that under neither will diversity be a va-
lid reason to impose an affirmative-action program.  Thus, after Par-
ents Involved, the last remaining argument for diversity as a legal justi-
fication for affirmative action in private employment must be that 
diversity could stand if Title VII is interpreted to permit employers 
more leeway to promote workplace diversity than the Constitution al-
lows.143  If Title VII is so interpreted, then diversity, as a legal justifica-
tion, must be found within the statutory confines of Title VII itself. 
C. Diversity in the Workplace? 
Parents Involved raises two key questions with regard to diversity 
and the workplace as governed by Title VII.  First, is the argument for 
“parity” between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause still plaus-
ible?  Second, can Title VII still be interpreted statutorily to permit 
race-based employment decisions promoting diversity even if Equal 
Protection does not allow such affirmative action?  Those are precise-
ly the two grounds that the Board argued in Taxman, and the Third 
Circuit rejected them both.144  Since the bulk of scholarship and legal 
analysis on this topic focuses on the former concern, this Comment 
analyzes the plausibility of the parity argument after Parents Involved; 
however, the arguments seem to overlap since the foundation for 
both is the same—the Court’s interpretation of the statutory text. 
If the Court interprets Title VII to grant private employers 
slightly more freedom than public employers are given under the 
Constitution, it is possible that diversity can be found to be a valid jus-
tification for an affirmative-action program.  The Court has already 
granted the private sector more leeway when it comes to affirmative-
action plans involving the remedial justification.145  The Court could 
conceivably extend that leniency to include some modicum of diver-
 
 143 This assumes that the Constitution would not permit diversity in the public 
workplace at all after Parents Involved. 
 144 Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1558–59 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 145 White, supra note 4, at 275 (“[E]ven if diversity is not a compelling state inter-
est . . . , might the statute permit an employer to make employment decisions aimed 
at achieving racial diversity?  [Johnson]’s view that the affirmative use of race under 
the statute was more permissive . . . at least for remedial purposes, suggests the an-
swer is yes.”). 
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sity.  Without Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved, ar-
guing that diversity had a fighting chance in any realm outside higher 
education would be difficult.  Justice Kennedy, however, left the door 
open ever so slightly for employers to attempt to use diversity to justi-
fy racial considerations in the workplace.  Early in his concurrence, 
Justice Kennedy firmly stated that “[d]iversity, depending on its 
meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school 
district may pursue.”146  Thus, Justice Kennedy refused to extinguish 
the possibility of diversity existing as a valid justification for affirma-
tive action outside of the remedial- and higher-education contexts.  
Any aspect of the workplace where this will be allowed, however, 
seemingly will be governed only by Title VII and not by the Constitu-
tion. 
As demonstrated by the Court’s analysis in Parents Involved, the 
Court no longer seems willing to grant substantial deference to enti-
ties that claim “diversity” as their compelling interest without inquir-
ing into the substance of what they are actually achieving.147  While the 
school districts claimed to be striving for diversity for “educational 
benefits,” the plurality closely examined the methodology and de-
termined that, in fact, the schools performed racial balancing.148  
While the Court might be more deferential to employers in the pri-
vate sector claiming “diversity” as their justification, given the Court’s 
recent restrictive, literal trend in statutory interpretation,149 Parents 
Involved indicates that the Court more likely will view such a rationale 
with greater skepticism.  This is signified by the unwillingness of both 
the plurality and Justice Kennedy to take the school districts’ diversity 
rationales at face value.150  Employers attempting to use the diversity 
rationale will have to develop persuasive arguments that demonstrate 
that diversity mirrors the intent of Title VII and that the methods 
employed to achieve that diversity do not “unnecessarily trammel” 
the interests of non-minority workers.151 
After Grutter, a number of scholars suggested “goals that may be 
served by accepting diversity as a justification for affirmative action in 
 
 146 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 147 Id. at 2758 (plurality opinion) (“Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘pa-
tently unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial 
diversity.’”). 
 148 Id. at 2755. 
 149 White, supra note 4, at 274. 
 150 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (plurality opinion), 2793 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
 151 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
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the private workplace.”152  One scholar argued that support for diver-
sity in employment comes from the very place where diversity is still 
allowed to stand—higher education.153  Because Justice O’Connor’s 
rationale for allowing diversity as a compelling interest involved con-
sideration of American businesses and the military, one scholar ar-
gued that it seems counterintuitive to prohibit diversity initiatives in 
the very areas that diversity in higher education is designed to bene-
fit—namely, the workforce.154  Similarly, another scholar noted that a 
diversified workplace benefits society by “counteract[ing] stereotypes 
and prejudices and cultivat[ing] broader and more inclusive trust 
and mutual regard within the workforce.”155  That argument may be 
one of the strongest in favor of diversity, but employers using it 
should proceed with caution. 
Other scholars suggested justifications for diversity including in-
creases in company productivity and a positive impact on general de-
cision making because of the ability of a diverse workforce to better 
serve an exceedingly more diverse clientele.156  In other words, “diver-
sity is often good for business.”157  A company’s business interest, 
however, would likely not be significant enough to justify the inten-
tional discrimination that goes along with affirmative-action pro-
grams, which Title VII seems to literally prohibit yet also implicitly 
permit, according to Weber,158 because of the statute’s purpose.159  The 
challenge to employers is to devise a way to justify diversity that will 
still further the intent of Title VII.  Using the potential for greater 
profit is probably not the best way to accomplish such a goal because, 
as one scholar notes, “where profit is the or a predominant employer 
motivation, courts may be more skeptical of and less willing to vali-
date diversity-based affirmative action practices that disfavor male and 
white employees.”160  The current Court, however, is one of the most 
pro-business Courts in a long time161 and, thus, might be willing to de-
fer to an employer’s claim that diversity is good for business. 
 
 152 Appel, Gray & Loy, supra note 22, at 571. 
 153 Turner, supra note 6, at 211. 
 154 Id. at 219. 
 155 Estlund, supra note 79, at 224. 
 156 Appel, Gray & Loy, supra note 22, at 571. 
 157 White, supra note 4, at 276. 
 158 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). 
 159 White, supra note 4, at 278. 
 160 Turner, supra note 6, at 234. 
 161 You Need to Know: News: Briefs, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2007, at 5, 6 (“At the end of . . . 
[the 2006–2007] U.S. Supreme Court term littered with heated 5-4 decisions, one bit 
of clarity is shining through: the Roberts Court . . . [is] very conservative and very 
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Even if an employer could devise a diversity-based justification 
for an affirmative-action program that would survive the Weber test, 
which will likely be viewed with an increasing level of skepticism by 
the Court, the employer would have to apply the program in a way 
that did not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of non-minority 
employees.162  The best way that an employer could go about doing 
this would be to devise initiatives similar to those suggested by Justice 
Kennedy as a means for constitutionally attaining diversity in 
schools.163  While a private employer obviously does not have to worry 
about triggering strict scrutiny, which is Justice Kennedy’s primary 
concern, the employer could use Justice Kennedy’s suggestions as a 
guide by launching race-conscious but still race-neutral initiatives.  
Large national corporations wishing to appeal to a broad consumer 
base could meet their goal of diversity by targeting the areas in which 
they interview potential employees or by building new offices and 
stores in places where the demographics indicate that they will be 
able to successfully achieve a diversified workforce.  So long as the 
employer focuses not on making evaluations based on race alone but 
on meeting the needs of its customers while also being conscious of 
the purposes of Title VII, those methods would probably not unne-
cessarily trammel the interest of non-minority workers.  Thus, al-
though Parents Involved narrowed and restricted legal arguments for 
finding diversity to be a valid justification for workplace affirmative 
action, conceivable options still exist through which the goal of diver-
sity may be achieved in the employment setting. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If it was true after Grutter that “employers considering and im-
plementing diversity-based affirmative action plans . . . should pro-
ceed with caution and with full awareness that the law in this area is 
not settled,”164 such a statement is certainly accurate after the Court’s 
decision in Parents Involved.  Diversity as a compelling interest in any 
realm outside of higher education is uncertain, although Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence still leaves room for its existence.  While Title 
 
pro-business—more so than any Supreme Court in decades.”).  But see Kenneth Starr, 
The Roberts Court Gets Down to Business: The Business Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 599, 602–03 
(2007). 
 162 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the inter-
ests of the white employees.”). 
 163 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 
(2007). 
 164 Turner, supra note 6, at 237. 
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VII has been, and likely will continue to be, interpreted to give em-
ployers more freedom and deference than they have under the Con-
stitution, Parents Involved undermined the “parity” argument that was 
so pervasive in the post-Grutter era with regard to affirmative action 
and diversity under Title VII.  A successful affirmative-action program 
designed to promote diversity in the workplace would likely have to 
both use race-neutral means to promote its ends and fully demon-
strate that the actual ends of diversity sought to be achieved comport 
with the purpose of Title VII. 
 
